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Miss Huang 13269682005 ET to china.Beijing shanghai （境外电子特价客票中国代理） 1、北美SOTO － 美国出境段有特价超过三十家航空公司的美国SOTO票 2、香港出境票－合作方提供近九十家航空公司的出港、代开纸票 3、其他境外电子客票： 美洲境内电子客票航空公司如下: UA、AA、AS、US、DL、CO、HP、NW、WN、F9、B6、TZ、AC、HA、FL、NK、SY、MX、AM、TA、RG、LA、WS、C6、AR 、AV、S3、G3、LP 欧洲境内电子客票航空公司如下: SK、LH、OS、AF、AY、BA、AZ、BD、NB、WF、UX、BE、TP、IB、SN、OK、JK、LX、KL、IB、AB、4U 、U2、X3 澳洲境内电子客票航空公司如下 QF、DJ、JQ、NZ、ZL 中东地区电子客票航空公司如下： EK、LY、A3、MA、LO、TK、TG、SQ、IT、IC (部分票需要邮寄) A national discussion on China held in 30 U.S. cities. Click here for more. Now more than ever, China’s rise is strongly influencing the course of world affairs, economic and political developments in the United States, and the daily lives of American citizens, from coast to coast and from all walks of life. CHINA Town Hall is a national day of programming that gives Americans in 30 cities the opportunity to hear directly from policy-makers and specialists about these issues and the implications for U.S. policy and their own communities. Shanghai March 21, 2007   Robert Zoellick, Vice Chairman, International, Goldman Sachs, delivered the third annual Barnett Oksenberg Lecture on Sino-American Relations, which the National Committee co-sponsors with the Shanghai Association of American Studies.  Continuing the theme first introduced at the National Committee's 2005 gala Dinner, Mr. Zoellick's topic was Sino-American Relations:  From the Shanghai Communiqué to Global Stakeholders.  Zhao Qizheng, the former Minister of the State Information Council, shared the podium with Mr. Zoellick, commenting on the speech.  The audience of 300 people was made up of the business, academic and policymaking communities of Shanghai and was held at the Jin Jiang Auditorium, the site of the signing of the historic Shanghai Communiqué, 35 years ago. March 21, 2007 As prepared for delivery   “From the Shanghai Communiqué to Global Stakeholders"   It is a special honor to be invited to deliver the Barnett-Oksenberg Lecture here in Shanghai.  As someone who especially values the relationship between our two countries, I am most appreciative of the enormous contributions of these two giants of learning and life over a half century’s work. I am most pleased, and touched, that Ms. Jeanne Barnett and Ms. Lois Oksenberg are here today.  Your presence gives this lecture particular meaning, beyond the words we say.             I would also like to pay my respects to the late Wang Daohan, a leader and mentor for many, who contributed so much to this city, his country, and relations between our two nations.             There are many people who offered a great deal to support this event, and I thank them for their numerous and thoughtful gifts of time, energy, and resources.             In particular, I am most pleased that Vice Chairman, and former Minister, Zhao would travel from Beijing to participate in this day, and to add a spirit of dialogue.  His writings are well-known. Professor Wang has kindly and skillfully moderated this lecture series since its inception in 2005.  I know, too, that many people from the Shanghai Association of American Studies and the National Committee on U.S.-China relations have worked long and hard for this day.  By way of expressing my appreciation to their many colleagues and friends, I would like to convey my personal thanks to Mr. Liu, Professor Ding, and Ms. Berris.  Thank you as well, to my friends at the American Chamber for your important assistance             I was fortunate to know Mike Oksenberg personally.  We had a particular bond: We attended the same small college, a school that valued intellectual rigor and robust analysis.  I always prized Mike’s rare combination of generosity, enthusiasm, knowledge, and hard-headed judgment in making policy.  Even in brief contacts – in seminars, conversations, and through his writings – I learned a tremendous amount.  Mike had the singular ability to connect a wealth of scholarship and experience to the challenges of governance, and did so in a way that linked strategic perspective with action.             Even though Mike served with President Carter, in President Nixon’s later years the former President developed a strategic dialogue with Mike about China.  They traveled together to China, exchanging perspectives, and showing how Americans of both parties can find common ground on this important country. I still miss Mike’s counsel.  And I could see that his kindness to me was shared by many others –Chinese and American – across generations and walks of life.  Even today, I see in the audience a Chinese scholar whom I came to know, and respect, through Mike.  That is a tremendous gift.             I did not know Professor Doak Barnett personally.  But I am struck that he was Mike Oksenberg’s mentor.  What a lineage.  Professor Barnett’s biography reads like the story of the United States in East Asia in the 20th Century.  Born and raised by missionary parents in China.  Studied China through Yale.  A Marine.  Newspaperman.  Ford Foundation.  Service in the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong.  And, fortunately for both countries, a scholar and a teacher.              China and the United States have endured sharp swings in the pendulum of our relations for over a century.  It is a fascinating story.  But not an easy one.  As an inheritor of those who contributed so much to the American comprehension of China, I am struck by Professor Barnett’s observation in his last major book: “I am less impressed by what I have learned over the years than about what I still must learn to understand China.”             There is another distinction for this lecture.  Last month was the 35th anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué.  Margaret MacMillan has just written a wonderful book, Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World.  Her story recalls the vision and maneuverings, strategy and gambles, excitement and tragedies, diplomacy and dangers, courage and pettiness, of those dramatic days.  And the immense personalities – most now historical shadows, whose hazy hues both illuminate and obscure our view of the past.             Margaret MacMillan thoughtfully sent me her book after we met earlier this year in Toronto, where I was giving a speech on – you might have guessed – China’s economic relations with the world.  As I read her narrative, I reflected on how some parts seemed strikingly familiar, and others were from an era as distant as the histories I had read in school.             The Shanghai Communiqué was more than a symbolic statement about an historic shift and reopening of ties between two countries of consequence.  It was an innovative diplomatic device.  The work was a credit to the creative intellects and skill of Premier Zhou, National Security Advisor Kissinger, and Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao. The Communiqué candidly acknowledged differences, rather than papering them over.  It reported “The Chinese side declared,” and “the U.S. side stated,” across a range of subjects.  The common interests were sparse; there were only two curt sentences on economics because the prospects were scant.  The key sentence was the mutual opposition to “hegemony,” the codeword for the threat of the Soviet Union.             Many of the topics of sharp debate in 1972 have been transformed over time: the Viet Nam War; Kashmir; North and South Korea.  The exception, of course, is Taiwan, where support of “one China” remains the centerpiece of each country’s approach today.  The Shanghai Communiqué reflects the reality of its time.  China and the United States were rediscovering one another.  It was the genesis of a relationship that was to grow, and expand, perhaps even flourish.  Today, we have a more mature, multi-faceted relationship – though China and the United States are still getting to know one another, trying to understand one another, as Professor Barnett counseled.             The Communiqué, however, is grounded with a core concept, an approach that we should strive to emulate: It envisages a strategic framework to guide relations.  In doing so, the Communiqué sought to secure the association against shifts in public attitudes and anxieties, against the calls from constituencies in each country that buffet the course of cooperation, which can even challenge the durability of ties.             In 1972, that strategic framework was anti-Soviet.  Our relationship was defined by what we were both against.  In 2007, we need to define our relationship by focusing on what we are both for.             That is why I outlined the concept of “responsible stakeholder” in a speech before the National Committee in late 2005, when I served as Deputy Secretary of State.  In doing so, my intention was not to constitute a special category for China.  Instead, I suggested that given China’s success, its size, its rising influence, it has an interest in working with other major countries to sustain and strengthen the international systems that keep the world more secure, enable it to be more prosperous, and open opportunities for our peoples.  This is a challenge for all the major participants – the EU, Japan, India, Russia, others, and of course the United States, too.             China recognized on its own this need to redefine its place in the world.  Although its internal challenges as a developing country remain great, China’s leaders perceive the external reverberations it is creating, including the anxieties.  That is why China has started discussing its “Peaceful Rise” or “Peaceful Development.”  Perhaps that is why Chinese television has produced an intriguing documentary series about the rise of global powers over five centuries.  This is a way to engage the Chinese public about the tasks ahead, possibly with a sense of pride but also with a spirit of practicality that has been part of China’s outlook since at least the time of Deng Xiaoping.             Sometimes it is said that Chinese leaders place the highest value on determining the principles that should guide policy.  That is sound logic.  Yet concepts such as “peaceful rise” or “development” have to come to life through policies and actions pertaining to real problems and opportunities.  Others will assess China’s – and the U.S.’s – rhetoric by considering deeds and achievements.              Today, I will highlight four topics where I believe China and the United States have mutual interests, where we can act as “shared stakeholders”: Korea; Iran; Sudan; and energy security.  This is not to say we see each challenge with the eyes of the other.  Our policies may differ.  But the commonalities of interest far outweigh the differences.  By acting in concert – along with others – we can be “responsible stakeholders.”             This is certainly not the full list of work we need to do together.  And I am not discussing the crucial topic of our economic relations, because I have done so on other recent occasions.  Yet these four topics will be highly significant in building the Sino-American international relationship.   Korea In 1992, China established diplomatic relations with South Korea.  This was an important step in China’s recognition that its interests on the peninsula, and indeed in the region, extend far beyond its Cold War connection to North Korea.             China and the United States share interests in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, fostering safety and security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and encouraging development, prosperity, and opportunity in the region. North Korea’s internal and external policies conflict with these interests.  Its nuclear program—sharply accentuated by its weapons test—weakens the nonproliferation regime.  In combination with its missile firings, North Korea’s nuclear weaponry could trigger an escalation in deterrence programs by others.  Its abductions of people from other countries, with Japan being a particular target, is inhuman and provocative.  Military tensions, and risks of miscalculations, could rise.  The vast majority of North Koreans have been reduced to a bare state of survival; many have died.  This existence does not accord with any principles of socialism or market development.  And these desperate conditions compel North Koreans to take increasing risks to flee, endangering themselves and potentially destabilizing the region. China has means to influence North Korea.  China has appeared, however, understandably reluctant to take steps that might destabilize its troubled neighbor.  China may also believe the North Korean regime could endure even deeper isolation, creating more hardships and hazards.  I also suspect that China does not want to have to handle this dangerous, and perhaps unstable, situation on its own.             That is why the Six Party discussions, and the U.S. initiatives within them, offer an important framework for addressing these insecurities.  The September 2005 agreed statement offers an alternative course for North Korea, North and South Korea together, and Northeast Asia.  China played an important role in forging the elements of that understanding.  In part based on suggestions from China, South Korea, and Japan, the United States has tried to clarify a positive pathway for North Korea and suggest incentives for North Korea if it changes course.  This common approach led to this February’s agreement, again with the support and assistance of China. If Kim Jong Il wishes to begin a course of change for his country, the United States will take steps to lessen tensions, assure security, and move towards normal relations.  No one wants to see the North Korean people suffer.  No one benefits from ongoing hostility that could flare into peril.             As the experience of China and others have shown, an economy cannot develop if it does not open to the world.  If North Korea chooses to open, the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia can assist.  Yet North Korea needs to understand—from China most of all—that this hopeful route is not possible if North Korea seeks to maintain nuclear weapons and programs. North Korea needs to shift from being a threat to security to evolving a development process that will create a better life for Koreans.             There is a possibility to finally end the legacy of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula, to move from tense armistice to affirmative peace treaty.  I believe the United States would welcome the opportunity to work with the two Koreas and China to put that bitter conflict to rest.  At the same time, the United States is sensitive to the history that led to Korea’s troubled century—reaching back to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, World War II, and the Korean War.  To achieve lasting security, U.S. policies, and China’s, will need to be alert to the concerns of all the parties in the region. Enhanced cooperation among the six parties would improve the international environment in which the two Koreas could someday end the cruel division of one people. Koreans—South and North—are fiercely independent and understandably sensitive to infringements on their sovereignty.  If the tensions between them are lessened, if economic and social links expand, it will be up to Koreans to determine the next steps in their future.  But the framework we are creating could assist them to navigate this course within the context of deeper regional cooperation, integration, and security.  As the lead U.S. negotiator in the Two-Plus-Four process, I saw that the division of Germany, another legacy of World War II and the Cold War, could not have been safely overcome without both the will of the German people to come together and the supportive work of Germany’s partners. The diplomacy of the February Six Party Accord has only been initiated.  There is much work ahead.  And the past record of North Korean performance--reaching back to the broken agreements between North and South Korea in 1991-92—raises suspicions.  There are risks of missteps and miscommunication.  North Korea, in particular, must decide which future it prefers.  At times, I suspect, North Korean officials will hesitate or appear paralyzed.  To keep moving ahead, day-to-day involvement of both China and the United States, working closely with South Korea, will be especially critical.  Japan and Russia also have important interests.  Our cooperation must be close.  Our work with all parties must build confidence as we maintain the momentum for progress. Iran             The world also faces a serious risk of nuclear proliferation and insecurity because of Iran’s actions, as the UN Security Council has formally recognized.  China’s inclination may be to try to avoid dealing with this danger, which, unlike North Korea, may seem far way.  Moreover, Iran is a large supplier of oil to China, and there is a potential for future investment and sale of more oil and gas to China.  Yet a posture of reserve would be short-sighted for China.  I urge China to consider the systemic risks of Iran’s posture. The market for energy—including China’s imports—reflects global supply and demand, not just exports from one energy producer.  If Iran develops nuclear weapons, the whole Persian Gulf region will be endangered.  Because China has been building ties with Arab states, particularly in the Gulf, I suspect it is aware of the anxieties Iran has raised in the neighboring Sunni states.  A nuclear-armed Iran could induce Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others to reconsider their decisions not to develop nuclear programs, as some have already stated.  If they did so, the breakdown in the nonproliferation regime would hasten, and states elsewhere, including in East Asia, would reconsider their options.             With more nuclear states, the risks of slippage of materials to terrorists increases.  Iran’s record of support of terrorist groups expands the hazard.  China may believe its internal security measures have limited its risk as a target.  But consider what will happen to the international economic system—with which China is deeply integrated and from which it benefits enormously—if terrorists strike anywhere with weapons of mass destruction.  The flow of goods, capital, services, ideas, people, and information across borders--upon which the globalized system depends--would come to a screeching halt.             One also needs to consider what Israel might do.  Iran supports terrorists who attack Israel.  Iran’s President has spoken of wiping Israel off the map.  He questions the reality of the Holocaust.  The Chinese are proud of their sense of history; the Jewish people have a strong historical memory, too.  It is burned in their soul that Jews once stood by as enemies threatened them with annihilation.             I hope this rendition of the stakes might lead China to cooperate more actively with the United States, the EU-3, Russia, and others to dissuade Iran from its course of uranium conversion and enrichment.  The Russians have found cause to stop work on the Bushehr nuclear plant.   China could help through vigorous enforcement of sanctions on dual use technology and by urging full cooperation with the IAEA’s detailed demands, as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1737.  As long as Iran resists the cooperation called for by the UN Security Council, it should be subject to additional pressure, applied in gradations.             The EU-3 and the United States have sketched a positive alternative for Iran.  It even includes peaceful nuclear energy.  Iran’s economic conditions have been worsening, despite high energy prices.  This huge producer of oil is now rationing gas to its people.  There are voices in Iran that are calling for a shift from confrontation in international politics.  China could play an influential role—differently from the EU and the United States—if its words and deeds encourage Iranian leaders to choose a path of integration, not confrontation leading to isolation.  Iran’s aging oil fields are decreasing production by 360,000 barrels per day each year, according to the National Iranian Oil Company.  China could let the Iranians know quietly that Iran will not gain new foreign investment if it continues a path of confrontation with the UN Security Council and the IAEA.   If we fail to work in concert now, together we will face severe consequences later.  And those consequences will greatly increase the risks to the energy security that China, the U.S., and others seek. Sudan I traveled to Darfur in Sudan four times in the course of less than 12 months in 2005-06.  The sights and smells and feelings would be deeply troubling to you.  The people who suffer the most are the parties with the softest voice.             The tragedy is compounded because there is a way to change circumstances consistent with the interests of most of the parties.  One of my last efforts as Deputy Secretary of State was to work with President Obasanjo of Nigeria in Abuja, and other African Union leaders and officials--as well as with EU, Arab League, and UN representatives--to try to mediate a peace accord between the Government of Sudan and rebel groups.  The Darfur Peace Agreement reached was consistent with the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, which ended another decades-old conflict in Sudan.  The CPA offered a new constitutional framework for relations between ­­­Khartoum and the peripheries, which the DPA complemented.  But the Darfur rebels split, and some would not sign.  Then the Sudanese Government made a disastrous decision: Instead of welcoming UN peacekeepers to buttress the overwhelmed AU forces and support the Darfur Peace Agreement, the Government of Sudan returned to fighting, including through reliance on the notorious Janjaweed militia, who burn, rape, and slaughter to terrorize.             The Sudanese Government could not and cannot impose a military solution.  It has suffered setbacks in the field.  It has weakened the very rebels who risked for peace.  The distress floods over the borders, and the destabilizing effects turn Sudan’s agony into an African danger.  The UN Secretary General is now trying again to persuade Khartoum to accept a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force.  Meanwhile, conditions on the ground are worsening, and humanitarian groups are either leaving or taking frightful risks to feed over 2 million desperate, displaced people.             China is a partner in Sudan’s energy development.  If Khartoum does not find a course for peace, that development will be at risk.  I know that China does not want to ignore genocide or crimes against humanity.  As China deepens its ties with Africa, I believe it would prefer to be a good partner of the African Union, which has twice denied Sudan the AU chair because of Khartoum’s behavior.  Of course, China’s dealings with Sudan will differ from that of the U.S. or the EU.  China wants to preserve its ties, especially because of energy.  Using the influence of those ties, China could gain great standing in America, Europe, Africa, the UN community, and with humanitarian NGOs if it successfully pressed Khartoum to act in its own self-interest for peace.  By doing so, China is also likely to gain the respect of the Government of Southern Sudan, created under the CPA.  This is in China’s interest, because much of Sudan’s untapped energy is in the South.             At times, it appears that China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has recognized that Khartoum’s stubborn and cruel behavior is self-destructive.  Any violence in Darfur—whether initiated by rebels, Janjaweed, or official government forces—triggers more outrage against Khartoum.  The terror weakens Khartoum internationally and with Sudan’s own people.  If the Sudanese Government backed a sizable AU-UN force, peace could be restored.  Rebel groups would also need to come to terms, along the lines of the DPA of 2006.  With security restored, the Janjaweed’s wave of brutality would need to end.                The millions of Darfurians in camps will not return home until it is safe to do so.  Only the UN forces can provide this security.  With security and a peace accord, countries around the world will assist Darfur’s development, which will benefit all of Sudan.  A tribal dialogue, in the tradition of Darfur, can support the mending.             Sadly, Khartoum seems to fear the UN forces, when in fact they offer the Government the only way to reverse a downward spiral.  That descent will take Khartoum further away from the integration in the international economy--and the African system—that it has sought.             I have seen other situations like this, both in Africa and on other continents.  The rulers think that stalling will lessen the problem or the outrage.  It does not.  The ends are dreadful.  A government cannot continually war against its own people, creating insecurity that threatens neighbors, without paying a fearful price.             China is respected in Khartoum.  Chinese officials can explain to Sudan’s leaders the reality of the country’s position with its nine troubled neighbors, the other states of the AU, and the rest of the international community.  China can point out why a UN peacekeeping force, working with the AU, is a key step in reversing Sudan’s downward spiral.  This will serve Sudan’s and China’s interests, and earn the appreciation of many others around the globe. Energy Security             In reviewing some of the principal issues for China and the U.S. as international stakeholders, it is striking how often the question of energy security arises.  I appreciate that China’s assured access to energy is fundamental to its development, growth, and social stability.  Energy security is important for the United States, too.             In my September 2005 speech, I identified energy as a subject that could become either a point of conflict or cooperation between the United States and China.  Both the United States and China have wasted energy, with poor environmental consequences.  As a developing country, China is understandably sensitive to limitations on its energy use, just as its impressive growth is improving the livelihood of China’s people.  Even though our two countries are at different stages of development, our mutual interests should lead us to work in concert.             We both have an interest in developing alternative sources of supply, whether nuclear, clean coal technology, biofuels, or other renewables.  We both would benefit from more diverse sources of oil and gas.  We both gain from improved efficiency and conservation, which also contribute to cooperation on the environment and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  We both are strengthened by building strategic reserves, which should be employed cooperatively with others through the guidance of the International Energy Administration.  And we both have an interest in ensuring that the energy trade is not stopped at chokepoints or manipulated through monopoly providers.             Sino-American cooperation on energy security may also improve the context for our cooperation on the other topics I discussed today.  It can build our confidence in working together to counter energy blackmail that could threaten regional or global security.             I was pleased that last year China’s National Development and Reform Commission took the initiative to convene India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States to discuss the energy topic.  It should also be part of foreign and security policy strategic discussions.  And I hope we can build the trust in both societies to enable our energy companies to find common business ventures as well. Conclusion The Communique released in Shanghai 35 years ago opened a portal for Chinese and Americans.  In 1937, 35 years before the Shanghai Communique, the people of this city faced invasion and brutal occupation.  So who can say what will be the perspective in Shanghai 35 years from now?             Since 1937, Americans and Chinese fought together as allies, battled against one another as enemies, closed doors to one another, reopened them, and deepened our integration in ways no one could have imagined.             It is my hope that China and the United States will not only deepen our cooperation with one another, but also sustain and strengthen the international order of political, economic, and security systems by working as mutual stakeholders, sharing responsibility.             This will not be easy.  China is a rising power and rising powers engender fears.  Our economic relations are mutually beneficial, but rife with sensitivities about imbalances, fairness, competition, and ensuring win-win opportunities.  Our security relations are hampered by incidents such as China’s test of anti-satellite weapons, especially given the absence of warning and explanation.  China’s military build-up will increase anxieties throughout the Asia-Pacific.             The United States, in turn, is the preeminent global power, but an unusual one.  Unlike most successful powers, it is the nature of the United States to challenge the status quo, so as to achieve a better world.  This transforming spirit can cause anxieties in others, too.  Yet America’s preference for dynamism, for change, offers opportunities.  It opens the mind to new possibilities.  It fosters a respect for China’s extraordinary accomplishments.  It provides a willingness to solve problems, to work together with a practical outlook.             This search for opportunity led President Nixon to come to China.  It leads me, in much more modest fashion, to suggest ways China and the United States can work together to pursue mutual interests.  I recognize that these ideas can only bear fruit through a dialogue, and I welcome the refinements, counterpoints, and even arguments of my Chinese friends.             Some in China have apprehensions about the United States, too, especially the U.S. commitment to freedom.  Freedom lies at the heart of what America is—part of our respect for human dignity.  Yet the United States does not urge the causes of rule of law, freedom, and democracy to weaken China.  To the contrary, America has seen that in the absence of freedom, societies breed cancers that will eat away at even the most impressive progress.  Then those countries breed ills that threaten others.  As President Bush said in his Second Inaugural, Americans recognize that others need to “find their voice, attain their own freedom, make their own way.”  Democratic institutions will need to reflect the values and culture of diverse societies. President Hu and Premier Wen have spoken of China’s need to strengthen the rule of law and develop democratic institutions.  China is experimenting with those concepts.  We should not avoid these topics or be defensive about them.  As friends, we can discuss, even debate, our experience, concerns, and beliefs.             Doak Barnett and Mike Oksenberg were great friends and admirers of China and its people.  During days both dark and sparkling, they tried to bring our countries a little closer.  It is fitting that we should recall, respect and recognize them.  We can best do so by carrying on their work, to learn and understand more about one another, to better enable the United States and China together to strive to accomplish the common good. The fifth annual Foreign Policy Colloquium for graduate students from the PRC to be held on June 6-9.
Fourth annual Student Leaders Exchange to China takes shape. Exchange to China National Committee's Winter/Spring 2006 newsletter and 2004-2005 Annual Report now available online. National Committee launches its 40th anniversary year with Past as Prologue: A Discussion with the National Committee's Founders. The Past as Prologue:  A Discussion with the National Committee’s Founders   Professor Robert A. Scalapino and Professor Lucian Pye, two distinguished scholars in the field of U.S.-China relations who have served as National Committee chairmen, discussed the founding of the National Committee, its work over the past 40 years and the role it might play in the future at a May 3 anniversary program in New York City.  National Committee chair Carla Hills welcomed the many current and former directors, members and guests who attended the program.   National Committee president Steve Orlins moderated the program.  During the discussion, Professor Scalapino pointed to four principles that the founders decided should guide the Committee’s work.  The organization should be non-governmental; its membership should include Americans from a wide range of sectors; it would not advocate for a particular position; and it would reach out to the younger generation.  Professor Pye pointed to diversity and flexibility as two keys to the Committee’s endurance and strength.  From the onset, the Committee welcomed a diverse set of views (its founders included academics, Quakers, business people and former diplomats), as it was felt that this enabled issues to be fully considered from a range of perspectives.  By remaining flexible, it has been able to keep pace with changes in China and in the Sino-American relationship and adjust to current circumstances as they presented themselves.   Please use the links below for an audio replay of the program. www.ncuscr.org/audio/pye_scalapino/carla.hills.intro.mp3 4 minutes www.ncuscr.org/audio/pye_scalapino/main.mp3  29 minutes www.ncuscr.org/audio/pye_scalapino/QandA.mp3  29 minutes Transcript of President Hu Jintao's speech on April 20, 2006, at a National Committee co-hosted dinner. Remarks from the Hu-Bush Summit:  A Discussion with Cheng Li, William R. Kenan Professor of Government, Hamilton College. Hu’s Opportunity?  Our Opportunity Seeking Common Interests at a Time of Mutual Suspicion Dr. Cheng Li, Hamilton College and the Brookings Institution April 17, 2006   Thank you, Steve [Orlins], for that overly generous introduction.  I wish my mother were here – she would believe every word.   I am honored – and a little overwhelmed – to speak to such a distinguished audience.  I want to applaud the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations for organizing this discussion on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States.  In my view, the significance of President Hu’s visit should not be judged in terms of whether or not two countries can reach some specific agreements in trade, security, energy, and education, but instead should be understood from a long-term strategic perspective.   China presently stands at a crossroad on both domestic and international fronts.  Internally, the country is in the midst of a developmental strategy shift, as I will explain shortly.  Externally, Chinese policy-makers and their advisors are in the process of rethinking both China’s medium-term priorities and long-term objectives in foreign policy, especially in its relationship with the United States.  On the U.S. side, a similar strategic reassessment of Sino-American relations is also taking place within government, business, and scholarly communities.  Arguably, no bilateral relationship in today’s world causes more confusion or anxiety – and will have more profound impact on global peace and prosperity – than the one between the United States and China.    For a long time, however, the majority of the people in the United States have woefully misunderstood the Chinese leadership and its dynamic strategic outlook.  Misperceptions, false predictions, sensational mystification, and wishful thinking have often outweighed thoughtful analysis and well-grounded assessments.  Inaccurate perceptions of the Chinese leadership could make our policies toward China less effective.  If our sights are distorted, our policies will be too.   In the following 20 minutes or so I will cover three major issues.  First, I will discuss some widely circulated misconceptions about Hu Jintao, especially in light of his accomplishments since his last official trip to the United States as Vice President of China.  The second part of my presentation will offer a detailed description of who Hu is, how his policy priorities differ from those of his predecessors’, and the direction in which China under his leadership is likely heading.  Third, I will outline President Hu’s principal agenda and objectives for this visit, as well as some of the likely outcomes.   1. Western Misperceptions and Misjudgments about Hu Jintao Let me begin with a quick review of some widely circulated misperceptions about Hu Jintao.  For several years, especially during his last official visit to the United States as PRC Vice President, many China analysts characterized Hu as an “incompetent or ineffective figurehead” who would long be under the shadow of Jiang Zemin; some analysts called Hu a “mysterious leader” who was “famous for being unknown.”  In the China-watching communities of the West, the most frequently asked question regarding Hu has been: “will Hu Jintao become China’s Gorbachev?” But this question completely ignores the Chinese perspective.  Characterizing Hu Jintao as “China’s Gorbachev” generally implies failure rather than success.  This does not necessarily mean that Hu is a conservative hardliner who rejects real political reforms, as some China analysts have described.  In my judgment, Hu is interested in political reforms, but these political reforms will be incremental over time and manageable in scale.   Today, as he is about to begin his official trip to the United States as the PRC President, Hu Jintao likely feels a great sense of accomplishment in reviewing what he has done over the past four years.  Let me highlight five of his most impressive accomplishments.    §     First, he has gained popularity among the Chinese public due to his effective leadership in fighting SARS, an unexpected and devastating epidemic that was frequently labeled “China’s Chernobyl” by the foreign media.   §    Second, he has transitioned smoothly into his position as Party chief and president, the first peaceful and institutionalized political succession in PRC history.   §     Third, President Hu and Premier Wen won a remarkable endorsement from the National People’s Congress last month, with a 97 percent majority vote approving the 11th Five-Year Plan.  The implementation of this plan will profoundly remap China’s economic landscape in accordance with the new leadership’s political vision and policy priorities.   §     Fourth, Hu’s warm reception of Taiwanese opposition party leaders during their recent visits to the mainland suggests that a war across the Taiwan Strait can, and should, be avoided.  This new wave of so-called Chinese panda diplomacy has dramatically reduced tensions across the Taiwan Strait.   §     Fifth, Hu has formed powerful patron-client ties in the Chinese political leadership.  The most crucial power base for Hu Jintao is the Chinese Communist Youth League, the so-called tuanpai.  Presently, tuanpai officials occupy 70 seats on the 356-member Party central committee (constituting about 20 percent of this decision-making body).  It is expected that tuanpai officials will occupy more seats on the next Central Committee, including its Politburo, which will be formed in the fall of 2007.  Increased Tuanpai influence suggests that Hu will most likely – and even more effectively – run the country for the next six or seven years.   Ironically, President Hu will likely receive a somewhat colder reception in Washington D.C. than he did four years ago.  Despite months of effort by the Chinese to have Hu’s visit treated as a “state visit,” guess what, Hu is still not coming for dinner at the White House.  Rightly or wrongly, in the view of many Americans, China should be blamed for things such as the skyrocketing price of gas, air pollution in Los Angeles, the 200 billion U.S. dollar trade deficit with China, and the outsourcing of American jobs.  The U.S. media continues to portray China as a country where people kill baby girls, eat dog meat, torture Falungong, and ban any form of political dissent.   The lack of enthusiasm about Hu’s visit on the U.S. side is understandable.  Some Western politicians and strategic thinkers no longer see Hu Jintao as “China’s Gorbachev,” but instead conceptualize him as a leader who opposes Western democratic ideals.  It is true that Hu’s administration has not scored well when it comes to freedom of the press.  Internet censorship has become much tighter in the Hu era.  But it is also true that present-day China is moving aggressively to confront the challenges of governance.  According to China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs, there were 280,000 registered NGOs in the country in 2005, including some 6,000 foreign NGOs.  A decade ago, such figures would have been unimaginable.   2. Who is Hu? A Populist and Pragmatist Now, let me move to the second topic.  If Hu is not an ineffective figurehead, not a mysterious leader, not “China’s Gorbachev,” and not a conservative hardliner, who is he? In my judgment, two terms most appropriately characterize Hu Jintao: one is “populist” and the other is “pragmatist.”  These two terms can help us better understand his personality, policy priorities, and political orientation as well as his foreign policy agenda.   Hu’s populist approach is evident in the rhetoric that has recently dominated political discourse in China, such as “people-centered development” and “a harmonious society.”  According to Hu, at a time when China faces serious challenges such as environmental degradation, energy scarcity, employment pressures, and economic disparity, the government should pay more attention to issues of social fairness and social cohesion.   Despite rapid economic growth, the Jiang Zemin era is primarily remembered for widening economic disparity.  Jiang allocated a disproportionately large amount of economic resources to Shanghai and other coastal cities while allowing many inland provinces to lag behind.  A quarter-century of economic reform has not only created a wealthy entrepreneurial class, but has also produced many “losers” in China.  Hu Jintao realizes that his mandate is to fix the serious problems associated with his predecessor’s elitist developmental approach.   The recently rising number of social protests in China has attracted a great deal of attention in both China and the rest of the world.  The annual number of protests, riots and group petitions was 87,000 last year — almost 240 incidents per day! One important fact, however, has often been neglected - the fact that these statistics were released to the public under Hu’s initiative.  Why did he do this? Hu wanted to show China’s public, and signal its political establishment, that a policy shift is needed.  Almost all of these protests were against local governments and business firms, not the Hu-Wen leadership.   To a great extent, Hu’s populist initiatives have already changed China’s course of development in four important ways:   §     First, from obsession with GDP growth to a greater reliance on environmentally friendly methods of growth, which consume less energy.  At the recent National People’s Congress meeting, the Hu-Wen administration called for a 20 percent reduction in energy consumption per unit of output, a 10 percent reduction in industrial pollution, and a 33 percent reduction in industrial use of water in the next five years.   §      Second, from an excessive emphasis on urban construction, foreign investment, and foreign trade, to greater concern for rural improvement with a focus on stimulating domestic demand. President Hu and other Chinese leaders have recognized that China’s economic growth currently depends too much on foreign trade.  In 1979, China’s foreign trade accounted for 13 percent of the country’s GDP, in 2004 that number reached 60 percent.  Hu believes that this trend should be reversed.   §      Third, from a single-minded emphasis on coastal development to a more balanced regional development approach.  Favorable policies and financial resources are currently being allocated to Chongqing in the west and Tianjin in the north rather than to Shanghai in the east and Shenzhen in the south as they were over the past two decades.   §      And fourth, from a policy that favors entrepreneurs and other elites to a populist approach that protects the interests of farmers, migrant workers, the urban unemployed, the elderly, and other vulnerable social groups.  Specifically, President Hu and Premier Wen have instituted many popular policies that include: reducing the tax burden on farmers, abolishing discriminatory regulations against migrants, and restricting land leases for commercial and industrial use.  The bottom line is that employment and social welfare have become central concerns for the Hu administration.   If there was one foreign leader who has really inspired Hu Jintao, it would probably be Franklin Roosevelt.  This is part of the reason why many Chinese scholars characterize Hu’s economic and socio-political program as China’s “New Deal” (xinzheng).   Hu is not only a populist, but also a pragmatist.  In my view, China analysts often emphasize only a small component of the ideological sources for Hu’s political initiatives.   §         | ||||||||||